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The possibility, let alone the actuality, of an ob-
jective morality has intrigued philosophers for well 
over two millennia. Though much discussed, the problem 
of the nature of morality is difficult to clearly con-
ceptualize. To conclude that "moral objectivity" is a 
contested concept is, to my mind, simply to give up the 
philosophical challenge of assessing the soundness of 
the concept. Moral objectivists face major difficul-
ties. In this paper I examine these difficulties, and 
I suggest that there are strong competitive subjectiv-
ist options and reservations. 
Objectivism and subjectivism come in various forms. 
R. Franklin writes that an objectivist "asserts, and a 
subjectivist denies, that there are at least sometimes 
ultimately better reasons for one moral view than for 
alternatives. Early emotive and prescriptive views 
were subjectivist [in this sense]. 1 , 1 As a thumbnail 
sketch of a form of subjectivism, this acceptably de-
scribes one of the central tenets of subjective ethical 
naturalism. R. M. Hare argues that there are ambi-
guities in the distinction between subjective and ob-
jective statements. 2 Consider the following three sen-
tences: (a) The cat is on the mat; (b) I like cats; 
and (c) Call the cat. The subjective-objective dis-
tinction, argues Hare, is ambiguous between (1) the 
distinction between (a), on the one hand, and (b) and 
(c), on the other hand, and (2) the distinction between 
(a) and (b), on the one hand, and (c) on the other 
hand. Hare prefers to call (a) and (b) 'descriptive' 
utterances and (c) a 'non-descriptive' utterance. The 
sense in which (b) is subjective as opposed to the 
sense in which (a) is objective, is the sense in which 
I claim morality is subjective. Both (a) and (b) are 
naturalistic claims--stating facts about the world dis-
closed by science. Those who take moral claims to be 
like (a) can be called objective naturalists. Objec-
tivism can also be supported by non-naturalistic argu-
ments; moral truths are not discoverable by scientific 
methods. Unlike non-descriptivists and objectivists, 
subjectivists claim that moral rightness and wrongness 
is dependent on the attitudes or inclinations of some 
set of speakers. 
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D. H. Monro distinguishes between 'naive subjectiv-
ism', the view that moral judgments state what the 
speaker feels, and the 'error theory', the view that 
"moral judgments refer to something outside the 
speaker's mind but are always |to that extent) false, 
since all that the speaker has a right to say is that 
he has a certain feeling or attitude."* According to 
Monro the error theory is "the only form in which sub-
jectivism has been seriously defended: the 'naive 
subjectivist' who has drawn the fire of most of the 
critics, is a man of straw."* As I see it, the central 
claim of the error theory is that though perhaps moral 
judgments or statements do not, in a strict sense, re-
fer to subjective attitudes of certain individuals, 
that is all they can be referring to, given factual or 
empirical analysis. Unlike our concepts of a good lec-
ture or a good wine, our concept of a good person does 
not seem to involve agreement about the objective nat-
ural properties referred to in such judgments. Though 
'referring' is going on, it is problematic why differ-
ent properties are being referred to by different per-
sons. Furthermore, there are disagreements in 'fun-
damental moral judgments' that seemingly cannot be re-
duced to disagreements about matters of fact, and thus 
amount to the expression of different attitudes. 
J. L. Mackie takes subjectivism to be the negative 
thesis that objectivism is false—there are no objec-
tive values.* By 'objectivism' Mackie refers to a 
position defined by several theses: First, the semantic 
thesis that moral judgments are either true or false. 
Their logic is thus distinguishable from the logic of 
the expression of merely subjective feelings. Second, 
the ontological thesis that moral value exists as an 
object or property of objects among the entities of the 
actual world. Given a correspondence theory of truth, 
moral judgments have truth-value in virtue of moral 
reality. Third, the epistemological thesis that objec-
tive values are the object of moral knowledge. Moral 
ignorance and false belief can be explained by refer-
ence to objective value. Fourth, the motivational the-
sis that moral judgments seem to be categorical imper-
atives or prescriptions whose claim on a person's will 
is not based on any appeal to the desires of that per-
son. The features of 'ought-to-be-doneness' and 
'ought-to-be-pursuedness' are constituent features of 
objective requirements and values.' 
A Divine Command Theory, which argues that it is 
God's willing something that makes morally good things 
morally good, may provide an objective basis for moral-
ity—at least for humans, though not for God. Of the 
four theses mentioned above, the motivational thesis is 
perhaps the most difficult to establish for the Divine 
Command Theory: If God is to be obeyed just because he 
is all-powerful then morality is simply a form of pru-
dence. 7 This is contrary to our pre-theoretical views. 
147 
The breadth of positions, both those of philoso-
phers and ordinary folk, that Mackie tries to capture 
within the single term 'objectivist* tends to make the 
term unwieldy. It is perhaps easier to find unity, not 
in what has been accomplished by the several positions 
he examines, but in what those positions attempt. The 
aim is still that of the Platonic enterprise, even 
though the Platonic solution is only one attempt among 
others. The aim is that of discovering or devising 
guides for action which are authoritative (overriding) 
and non-relative. The subjectivist argues that such 
guides have as yet neither been constructed nor discov-
ered, and, furthermore, that there is no good empirical 
evidence that they could be. Though this results in a 
loss of a certain degree of agreement with our pre-
theoretical views, it improves the overall simplicity 
of the naturalist account. 
The claim to objectivity is not that moral judg-
ments are descriptive, prescriptive, universalizable, 
categorical, imperatival, nor action-directing or prac-
tical. It is rather that moral judgments can be vali-
dated as true or false, independently of an agent's 
desires and inclinations—'independent' in the sense 
that empirical and formal judgments are independent of 
an individual's desires. When the subjectivist denies 
that the authoritative force of moral action-guides is 
anything more than the force of an individual's over-
riding desires, he can be seen as denying that there 
are objective values or that there is a way of objec-
tively validating such desires. 
One may ask, does the existence of an objective 
method for resolving moral controversies imply the ex-
istence of objective values; or, contrapositively, does 
the non-existence of objective values imply that there 
is no objective method for resolving moral disputes? 
Subject!vists would answer this question in the affirm-
ative. Somewhere in the procedures, methods, reason-
ing, logic, exercises, or language of morals a subjec-
tive element, having the status of a decision, will be 
involved, although it will tend to be objectified. 
Appealing to any normative model, however general, will 
not enable one to avoid the problem of subjective ac-
ceptance. And that problem, according to the subjec-
tivist, can only be resolved by the agents involved 
consulting their desires, finding out what they like, 
perhaps by finding out what they are like. There is a 
difference between saying that contingencies are in-
volved and saying that the basis of the acceptance is 
subjective, but this does not affect the subjectivist 
position. To say that the world is such-and-such and 
that the human situation is such that egoism is not a 
contingently possible choice for any clear-headed in-
dividual is, in general, different from saying that 
most or all humans would find it not to their liking. 
I suggest that to speak of one's likings is one way of 
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talking about one's 'nature'. To examine the con-
tingencies behind one's nature is to explore causal 
hypotheses that explicate one's behavior, verbal and 
non-verbal. A complete exploration of the contingen-
cies governing one's situation, may show that, all 
things considered, one cannot sincerely say that one 
likes such-and-such. I accept Monro's view that the 
naturalist becomes a straw man once the subjective com-
ponent (talk of likes and dislikes) is divorced from 
the natural component (talk of contingent features of 
the empirical world). When we examine the contingen-
cies behind our concepts we may find ourselves faced 
with choices regarding the management of our conceptual 
lives. 
Conceptual and linguistic analysis is insufficient 
to establish sound theories of the meaning and verifi-
cation of statements in normative ethics. In addition, 
some form of factual analysis, as Mackie calls it, is 
needed. Such analysis necessitates a departure from 
standard twentieth century discussions in meta-ethics. 
R. Brandt provides a fair outline of the terms of the 
standard discussion: 'Non-naturalism', according to 
Brandt, "affirms (1) that . . . ethical terms are mean-
ingful and that . . . ethical statements are true or 
false and (2) that . . . ethical terms do not name ob-
servable qualities . . . and that their meanings cannot 
be defined, even partially, by citing a relation be-
tween them and names of observable qualities."* 'Na-
turalism' or 'definism' accepts (1) and rejects (2). 
'Non-congnitivism' rejects (1) and accepts (2). Some 
forms of non-cognitivism claim that ethical utterances 
have meaning, say emotive meaning, but lack any truth-
value; other forms, say nihilism, will reject (1) 
outright. Beneath the usual meta-ethical concern with 
questions of meaning and justification are larger meta-
physical issues, which often are disregarded for no 
good reason. Naturalism includes the metaphysics of 
empiricism. I would therefore advocate a philosophical 
approach that involves a certain semantic descent. In 
fact, in 'defining' or 'explaining' morality, the natu-
ralist does not take the semantics of our moral lan-
guage at face value—he argues that it is deceptive, 
involves factual errors, and requires revision. 
Philosophical investigations into the nature of 
morality attempt to provide us with an explanation of 
what we are (really) doing when we make moral judg-
ments. One might ask what such investigations have to 
do with what we should do? The answer is nothing nec-
essarily. It is only if we do value, do have a subjec-
tive concern, for descriptive accuracy and empirical 
truth, and only if we do prefer our fundamental prin-
ciples to be well informed by the empirical facts, that 
philosophical investigations into the nature of moral-
ity will have any effect on our substantive moral posi-
tions . 
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Of the various forms of objectivism, objective eth-
ical naturalism seems to me to be an implausible alter-
native. It is hard to find anyone holding it in its 
most simplistic form. I tend to think that any such 
position will have trouble making sense of the motiva-
tional aspects of morality, why we attach such impor-
tance to moral demands. How does something by simply 
being the case provide motivation for action? This is 
an embarrassing question for objective ethical natural-
ism. To hold in its most simplistic form, as a thesis 
about the ontological status of moral values, I would 
think that an objective ethical naturalist would have 
to hold that values exist in the world in the same way 
as material objects exist, or as features of such ob-
jects exist, or as relations among such objects and 
features exist. 
Mackie briefly suggests that there may be categori-
cal imperatives which are counsels of prudence.* Such 
counsels of prudence would be related to an agent's fu-
ture well-being, whether or not he had any present de-
sire that his future desires should be satisfied. One 
might try to develop a theory of objective interests 
upon this model and try to build upon this base some 
sort of objective ethical naturalism. It is notorious 
that the importance people attach to interests differ 
not only among individuals but also for a given indiv-
idual at different times. Though we may speak of basic 
'needs' and 'interests', we must recognize such needs 
and interests may be rationally sacrificed. For gain, 
glory, and love humans have been willing to take great 
risks and make great sacrifices. As a subjectivist, I 
think that the project of constructing an objective na-
turalism would always remain unanchored—at some point 
there must be an empirical connection between 'present 
self' and 'future self', or 'prudent self', or 'moral 
s e l f , that will provide the impulse towards taking 
action. I admit that morality could be that sort of 
practice, game, or institution that once you subscribed 
to it your present desires were in some sense ir-
relevant, as they are in a game of chess—whether I 
like it or not, I may well be in checkmate. The cont-
ingencies of the human situation may be such that opt-
ing out of the morals game may well be practically im-
possible for any given individual. Nevertheless, 
besides having reservations about such conclusions, I 
want to say that 'acceptance' must come into the story 
at some level. Mackie argues that the "rationalist's 
program is to show that there are objectively valid 
necessary principles of action, intrinsically authori-
tative prescriptions or directives. H I 8 I admit that 
someone could produce an objective ethical naturalism 
that shows no concern for motivational questions. But, 
objectivity without prescriptivity gives the game away. 
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